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Abstract
We state eﬃciency conditions for the provision of congestable local
public goods that diminish individual-speciﬁc proprietary risks. The
optimum level of such a public service is determined by equating the
sum of the reductions of the expected property losses due to a better
service level with the marginal costs of the service. The optimum size
of the providing local authority in terms of population is obtained
where the increase in proprietary risks due to congestion meets the
decrease in contributions for the original citizens. As an empirical
example, we employ Germany’s crime statistic in order to assess the
eﬃciency of the provision of police services at the state level.
Keywords: Local Public Goods, Congestion, Risk, Crime, Police
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1 Introduction
Between the polar cases of Samuelson’s (1956) pure public goods and pri-
vate goods, there is a multidimensional spectrum of impure public goods. In
textbook economics (for example, in the deﬁnitive book by Cornes and San-
dler, 1986), we usually focus on the degrees of divisibility and excludability
of beneﬁts. An alternative way to distinguish between diﬀerent categories of
∗Author for correspondence. Stefan Traub, Department of Economics, University of
Kiel, 24098 Kiel, Germany, traub@bwl.uni-kiel.de.
1public goods is to look at the diﬀerent channels through which they make
an impact. In a recent paper, Lohse et al. (2005) broadened the topology of
public goods by uncertainty: some public goods do not directly contribute
to the beneﬁts of their users. Actually, these goods reduce the probability
and/or the size of a potential damage (on the distinction see Ehrlich and
Becker, 1972). According to Lohse et al., typical textbook examples such
as lighthouses, national defense, or ﬁre departments belong to either cate-
gory. For instance, a lighthouse is a navigation aid that prevents sea damage,
whereas ﬁremen will take great pains to keep ﬁre losses as small as possible.
In this paper, we consider local public services that diminish individual-
speciﬁc proprietary risks. It is assumed that the beneﬁts of the publicly
provided good remain within the city limits, that is, spillover eﬀects are
negligible. Though it may be technically possible to exclude several citizens
from the consumption of the service, doing so is not desired for political
reasons. For a given level of provision, an increase in population will abate
the quality of the service for the original citizens. People cannot vary their
utilization rates. However, the population may be heterogenous as to the
actual size of the beneﬁt in terms of risk reduction. A typical example for
such a public service is the police. The police prevent and detect crime.
As households diﬀer in their endowments (property, location within the city,
etc.), they also diﬀer in their exposure to crime.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy review
the relevant literature. The model is introduced in Section 3. Eﬃciency
conditions are derived in the fourth section. Section 5 presents the empirical
application. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 A Brief Literature Review
In his pioneering article “The pure theory of public expenditure” and its
subsequent “Diagrammatic exposition” Samuelson (1956, 1957) formulated
a “polar case model of government, to be contrasted with the traditional
individualistic model of general equilibrium” (Musgrave, 1983, p. 329). As
Musgrave (1983, p. 330) remarked, two oﬀsprings of the theory of public
goods have received particular attention in literature. The ﬁrst deals with
public goods that are subject to congestion or crowding. The second is con-
cerned with public goods whose “beneﬁts are spatially limited” (p. 330).
Oates’ (1972, 1999) famous decentralization theorem deals with the latter
case: from a normative view, the provision of pure public goods “the con-
sumption of which is deﬁned over geographical subsets of the total popula-
tion” (p. 35) by local governments is always at least as eﬃcient as the uniform
2provision by a central government. The pessimistic undertone in Samuelson’s
work as to the ability of both market and governmental institutions to allo-
cate public funds in an optimal way prompted Tiebout (1956) to contradict.
Under rather restrictive assumptions, his model comes up with an eﬃcient
solution of decentralized local public goods provision: “The consumer-voter
may be viewed as picking that community which best satisﬁes his preference
pattern for public goods” (p. 418).
In his critical assessment of the Tiebout model, Bewley (1981, p. 715)
introduced the distinction between pure public goods and what he called
pure public services. The ﬁrst notion refers to publicly provided goods the
provision costs of which are independent of population size. In the latter
case, costs are proportional to population, that is, these services are essen-
tially consumed as private goods (though provided publicly). On the one
hand, Bewley (1981, p. 732) proved the existence and eﬃciency of Tiebout
equilibria; at the same time he demonstrated that this result clings to the
assumption that local governments provide public services rather than public
goods. One way to overcome this problem is the assumption of a U-shaped or
otherwise varying relationship between production costs and population size
(see, for example, Tiebout, 1956; Buchanan, 1965; McGuire, 1974; Wood-
ers, 1978), but “this introduces a complication in that optimal community
size and the choice of public service level are interdependent” (Bewley, 1981,
p. 734).
Whether the relationship between population size and local expenditures
is constant, proportional, or U-shaped is a question that has to be answered
empirically. Hence, it is not too surprising that a large body of literature
on the “publicness” of local public goods has developed, beginning with
the works of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman
(1973). Though some methodological objections have been raised against
their approach (Oates 1988; Reiter and Weichenrieder, 1997, 1999), the gen-
eral bottom line of these studies is that most public services exhibit estimates
of the congestion parameter close to 1, meaning that these goods are private
(compare, for example, Table 1 in the survey by Reiter and Weichenrieder,
1997, p. 379).1
In our empirical application, we focus on internal security. That is, the
public service to be considered is the police, which prevent and detect crime.
The economic theory of crime goes back to Becker (1986) and Ehrlich (1973,
1996). Here, crime is explained as the outcome of an individually rational
1This result has provoked an important question: if most publicly provided goods are
private, why are they provided publicly at all (compare, for example, Holcombe and Sobel,
1995)? The most obvious reason is non-excludability.
3process of considering the expected beneﬁts and costs of committing an of-
fense. Empirical analyses of crime have been carried out, for example, by
Levitt (1997), Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999), B¨ uttner and Spengler (2003),
and others. Levitt (1997) investigated the deterrence eﬀect of police on crime.
Controlling for electoral cycles, Levitt found that an additional police oﬃcer
on average eliminated eight to ten serious crimes per year. He estimated that
the social beneﬁt of reduced crime was about $ 100,000 per oﬃcer per year
and reasoned that the current number of police was below the optimal level.
Drake and Simper (2005) assessed the technical eﬃciency of police provision
using a stochastic frontier approach.
The approach of Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and
Goodman (1973) for the measurement of crowding has been applied to the
police as well. Reiter and Weichenrieder (1997) listed 9 diﬀerent studies that
found crowding parameters in a range between 0.64 and 2.01; yet most of
them were close to 1. Borcherding and Deacon (1972) used aggregated US
data at the state level, while all other studies used community level data.
However, their estimate of 1.019 is perfectly in line with the other authors’
results.
All these studies measured the level of the public good in terms of local
public expenditures on, for example, the police. This proceeding neglects
the fact that the beneﬁts of the public service are indirect, through the re-
duction of proprietary (and other) risks, rather than direct. On the other
hand, empirical studies of crime, such as Levitt’s (1997), explicitly consider
the deterrence eﬀect of the police on crime, but they do not apply the local-
public-good character of the police. In this paper, we join both strands of
literature. In the following two subsections, we formulate a general model of
the provision of local public goods, that diminish individual-speciﬁc propri-
etary risks, and derive a Samuelson condition and a membership condition
for such services. Then, we employ a simpliﬁed version of the model in order
to assess the eﬃciency of the provision of the police in Germany at the state
level. We explicitly derive estimates for the marginal beneﬁts of an addi-
tional police oﬃcers, both in terms of reduced crime rates and in monetary
terms, and for the marginal costs of population due to crowding.
3 The Model
Wealth is denoted by w, w ∈ R+. I = {1,...,n} is the index set of house-
holds. Each household i is threatened by a household-speciﬁc risk of losing
`i of its wealth wi with probability pi, where 0 ≤ `i ≤ wi. The probability of





Our sole assumption about pi(·) is that it is a continuous and diﬀerentiable
function, pi : R+×R+7→[0,1], that is, for the single households pi(·) could be
increasing, decreasing, or u-shaped. For instance, if G was the level of police
protection, then for most households pi(·) would be a decreasing function
of G and an increasing function of n, where the latter sign is explained by
congestion. Yet, there may be some households, say, at the periphery of a
city for which the risk of getting mugged increases as crime relocates from
the city center to the outskirts.
The total cost of the local public service is an increasing function of the
its level,
C = C(G) , (2)






where 0 ≤ ci ≤ wi. For a given G, an increase of population will reduce the





G > 0 and ci
n < 0.
We assume that households can insure themselves against losses on pri-
vate insurance markets. Typical loss risks are, for example, covered by the
householder’s burglary insurance and the car-theft insurance. Let the insur-
ance premium be denoted by qi, 0 ≤ qi ≤ wi. In case of a loss the household
















where ui(·) is the household’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
Note that we also must have 0 ≤ qi+ci ≤ wi. If the insurance contract is ac-
tuarially fair and the nonproﬁt condition applies, the expected compensation
payment for the household must equate the insurance premium:
p
i(G,n)zi = qi . (6)

























The household’s optimum demand for compensation, z?, is obtained by























for z. Since ui(·) is a strictly concave function of wealth, condition (8) is
equivalent to






i(G,n) = wi − p
i(G,n)zi − c
i(G,n) . (9)
Not surprisingly, the household wants to fully insure its potential losses:
z
?
i = `i . (10)
4 Eﬃciency Conditions
In this section, we derive the conditions for an eﬃcient provision of the local
public service, with the proviso that households buy insurance on private









In order to obtain the optimal solution, a social planner maximizes a













Under the assumption that the social planner cares only for the welfare of




































 ! = 0 . (14)






G(G,n) = 0 ∀ i ∈ I . (15)





G(G,n) = CG(G) (16)






G(G,n)`i = CG(G) . (17)
This is a Samuelson condition for the provision of a local public service that
diminishes individual-speciﬁc proprietary risks. On the left, we have the sum
of the marginal beneﬁts of the local public service. On the right, we have
the marginal costs. As noted above, the level of the public good inﬂuences
the marginal beneﬁts only indirectly, via a reduction of the probability of an
adverse event. For each citizen, the marginal beneﬁt is given by this change of
the probability times the loss that is involved by the event. Accordingly, the
Samuleson condition states that the optimum level of the service is reached
where the community-wide expected reduction of individual property losses
meets the marginal costs of an additional unit of the service (for example, a
policeman).2
Likewise, the derivative on the left side of ﬁrst-order condition (14) is













n < 0, this equation states that for each citizen the increase of ex-
pected property losses due to the crowding eﬀect of an additional citizen
must equal the marginal decrease of her contribution to the public service.











2Note that this condition requires the probability of a loss to be a decreasing function
of the level of the public service for suﬃciently many households. Otherwise, the marginal
cost would always exceed the sum of the marginal beneﬁts. Thus, the service should not
be provided at all.
75 Empirical Application
Here, we apply our model to the provision of internal security, considering the
German police as an example. After having introduced the data set in the
next subsection, we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the parameters
of equation (1), which state the probability of suﬀering a property loss as a
function of the level of public service and population. For data reasons,
we have to limit our attention to the state level, that is, the 16 German
“Bundesl¨ ander”. We deﬁne p as the probability of becoming victim of a
crime that involves a loss of property ` for the victim. G denotes the number
of police oﬃcers and n the population of the respective state.
In a second step, we compute the marginal beneﬁts of a police oﬃcer, that
is, the expression on the left hand side of the Samuelson condition (17). We
also compute the marginal congestion costs of an additional citizen, which is
the expression on the left hand side of the membership condition (20). Fi-
nally, we make an attempt to assess the eﬃciency of the provision of internal
security in Germany. Since we have to conﬁne ourselves to analyzing only
those oﬀenses which both involve a measurable loss of property and can be
fully underwritten, it would be inappropriate to use data on state expendi-
tures on internal security in order to calculate the respective cost function
(that is, the right side of the Samuelson condition and the membership con-
dition, respectively). As a substitute for solving these conditions for the
optimum number of police oﬃcers and the optimum population, we assess
eﬃciency indirectly by computing the optimum number of police oﬃcers in
per-capita terms for each state.
5.1 The Data
Our data refers to the year 2004. Table 1 reports for each of the 16 German
federal states: area A in square kilometers, population n, population density
n/A, and number of police oﬃcers G. Area, population, and population den-
sity are taken from the internet portal of Germany’s federal statistical oﬃce
(Statistisches Bundesamt, www.destatis.de). The number of police oﬃcers
at the state level is published annually by the Statistisches Bundesamt in
its statistic of public servants (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2005). The ﬁgures
reported in the table refer to full-time equivalents, that is, part-time ser-
vants are weighted by their contractual working hours relative to a full-time
position.
The three city-states Berlin, Bremen, and Hamburg stand out by their
population density, whereas the former East German states exhibit a rel-
atively low population density. As it is to be expected that the extent of
8Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
State Area Population Populat.
density
Policemen
A km2 n n/A G
Baden-W¨ urttemberg (BW) 35,752 10,692,556 299 30,538
Bayern (BAY) 70,549 12,423,386 176 36,397
Berlina,b (B) 892 3,388,477 3800 24,146
Brandenburgb (BB) 29,478 2,574,521 87 9,893
Bremena (HB) 404 663,129 1640 3,342
Hamburga (HH) 755 1,734,083 2296 9,716
Hessen (HE) 21,115 6,089,428 288 17,865
Mecklenburg-Vorpommernb (MVP) 23,179 1,732,226 75 6,586
Niedersachsen (NDS) 47,620 7,993,415 168 22,029
Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) 34,084 18,079,686 530 46,538
Rheinland-Pfalz (RLP) 19,853 4,058,682 204 11,106
Saarland (SL) 2,569 1,061,376 413 3,400
Sachsenb (SN) 18,415 4,321,437 235 15,009
Sachsen-Anhaltb (SNA) 20,446 2,522,941 123 10,144
Schleswig-Holstein (SH) 15,763 2,823,171 179 7,821
Th¨ uringenb (TH) 16,172 2,373,157 147 7,871
German (GE) total 35,7046 82,531,671 n.a. 262,401
Mean 22,315 5,158,229 666 16,400
Table notes. aCity state. bFormer East Germany. All data refer to 2004. Data sources:
www.destatis.de and Statistisches Bundesamt (2005).
crime varies with population density (see, for example, Glaeser and Sacer-
dote, 1999), it will be included as a covariate in the regressions of G and n
on p.
Table 2 gives the probability of becoming victim of a crime which in-
volves a loss of property, and the respective proprietary damage in Euros
per capita. Figures are presented for (i) all cases, (ii) all unsolved cases,
and (iii) all unsolved cases of theft. Germany’s federal criminal police oﬃce
(Bundeskriminalamt, 2005) annually publishes a very detailed crime statis-
tics which is based on the states’ crime statistics.3 Their index of criminal
oﬀences is categorized into eight main groups: murder and manslaughter
(group 0), oﬀences against sexual self-determination (1), brutality and depri-
vation of liberty (2), theft (3 and 4), proprietary crimes and forgery (5), other
oﬀences against penal law (6), oﬀences against other laws (7). However, only
some oﬀences within each group involve a measurable proprietary damage,
3The data used in this study was made available to us by the Bundeskriminalamt in
machine-readable form.
9Table 2: Risk and Per-Capita Property Loss
All cases Unsolved cases Unsolved cases
of theft
State Risk p.c. loss Risk p.c. loss Risk p.c. loss
p ¯ ` e p ¯ ` e p ¯ ` e
BW 0.0358 82.01 0.0174 19.33 0.0157 12.18
BAY 0.0295 76.70 0.0134 17.81 0.0119 9.11
B 0.0952 184.48 0.0611 79.70 0.0513 47.00
BB 0.0545 112.07 0.0282 36.39 0.0260 29.70
HB 0.1118 71.60 0.0725 38.38 0.0662 30.97
HH 0.1044 171.04 0.0684 63.15 0.0597 54.27
HE 0.0486 94.20 0.0290 37.81 0.0251 24.36
MVP 0.0696 95.72 0.0347 29.61 0.0314 24.20
NDS 0.0483 92.21 0.0266 22.81 0.0245 18.85
NRW 0.0577 118.62 0.0357 43.21 0.0322 31.64
RLP 0.0427 58.57 0.0214 22.23 0.0186 16.87
SL 0.0410 74.63 0.0224 26.70 0.0195 17.47
SN 0.0484 51.38 0.0236 17.06 0.0218 14.40
SNA 0.0572 66.58 0.0287 22.88 0.0264 18.96
SH 0.0573 119.88 0.0363 39.18 0.0333 22.58
TH 0.0409 41.06 0.0184 14.38 0.0165 11.19
GE 0.0500 97.77 0.0281 31.71 0.0252 22.14
Table notes. All data refer to 2004. Data source: Own calculations based
on Bundeskriminalamt (2005).
that is then reported in the crime statistics: holdup murder (subgroup 0110);
robbery, extortionate robbery, and robbery of motorists (2100); extortionate
kidnapping (2330); hostage taking (2340); theft (complete groups 3 and 4);
fraud (5100); defalcation (5200); embezzlement (5300); bankruptcy crimes
(5600); extortion (6100); and certain economic crimes (7120, 7130, 7140,
7150). In order to compute p, we refer only to the oﬀences in this list, except
for those from group 7. Such crimes as, for instance, copyright and patent
infringements, usually aﬀect ﬁrms rather than private households.
For other oﬀenses, such as murder and assault, one could try to ﬁnd the
respective monetary equivalents. For instance, in his very detailed study on
the costs of crime in Germany, Spengler (2004) put forward an estimate of
e1,65 million for the value of a statistical life (p. 106). He compared the
wage markups of occupation groups that face diﬀerent fatal-accident risks
and a panel structure of the data in order to obtain his estimates. Without
question the evaluation of health and life involves many problems and value
10judgements. On account of this, and because the eﬃciency conditions stated
in Section 4 apply only to risks that can be fully underwritten, we restrict our
attention to those oﬀenses listed above, which involve a directly measurable
proprietary damage. Of course, a full cost-beneﬁt analysis of the police would
have to take into account the whole spectrum of crime.
In column three, where we list the per-capita damage of all recorded cases,
we implicitly assume that the associated loss of property persists even if a
crime has been solved. In column ﬁve, we make the opposite assumption,
that is, households get fully compensated for their loss after detection of the
crime. Theft is reported separately, mainly for two reasons. First, theft in
all its variations is a risk that can be fully underwritten. Second, in terms of
case numbers, theft is the most important delict in the crime statistics and
it has a relatively low detection rate. It contributes about 72 per cent of all
cases in our list and about 89 per cent of all unsolved cases.
As can be seen in Table 2, the average risk of becoming a crime victim was
about 5 per cent (within a period of one year). If we take into account only
unsolved cases, it was 2.8 per cent. The probability of unsolved theft was
2.5 per cent. City-state Bremen (HB) was the leader in all three categories,
while Bayern (BAY) was the safest place to live in.
As to the per-capita property loss, we note that the largest ﬁgures show
up in Berlin (B) — a yearly damage of more than e180 per capita. Referring
to Germany as a whole, the per-capita damage was almost e100. Multiplied
by population, this gives as total proprietary damage of e8 billion in 2004.
Unsolved cases of theft caused a per-capita damage of about e22 and a total
damage of e1.8 billion.
We do not want to withhold some limitations of our data. Many crimes
do not get reported at all and, therefore, do not show up in the crime statis-
tics. In some cases which have entered the crime statistics the actual loss
of property could only be estimated; in other cases a symbolic value of one
Euro was reported (and those cases cannot be separated from the rest). Fur-
thermore, the probabilities listed in Table 2 are only an approximation of
the “real” probability of an average person of becoming victim of a crime as
some cases might have aﬀected several people at the same time.
5.2 Estimating p(G,n)
Let J = {1,...,16} be the index set of states. We assume that the functional
form of pi(·) is identical for all people living in Germany and possesses a
11logistical distribution:
p
j = p(Gj,nj) =
1
1 + exp[−(α + βGj + γnj + δ
nj
Aj)]
∀j ∈ J , (21)
where pG ≤ 0 if β < 0 and pn > 0 if γ + δ/Aj > 0. The last term in
the exponential function, δnj/Aj, has been included to capture the eﬀect of
population density. α determines the basic probability of a loss at p(0,0).
Obviously, for α = 0, we have p(0,0) = 0.5. For α → ∞ and α → −∞, we
observe p(·) = 1 and p(·) = 0, respectively. Multiplying (21) by 1−p, taking
the natural log and adding a disturbance term ε yields a well-known result,







= α + βGj + γnj + δnj/Aj + εj j ∈ J , (22)
which can easily be estimated (for grouped data) using weighted least squares
with
p
njpj(1 − pj) as regression weights.4
Table 3: Logit-Model, ML-Estimates
Risk scenario
Variable Coeﬀ. All cases Unsolved cases Unsolved cases
of theft
Constant ˆ α −2.813 −3.460 −3.557
0.001 0.002 0.002
Policemen (G) ˆ β −0.952E − 4 −0.132E − 3 −0.133E − 3
0.259E − 6 0.157E − 2 0.356E − 6
Population (n) ˆ γ 0.226E − 6 0.323E − 6 0.327E − 6
0.638E − 9 0.830E − 9 0.878E − 9
Population (n/A) ˆ δ 0.546E − 3 0.729E − 3 0.713E − 3
density 0.949E − 6 0.123E − 5 0.130E − 5
Log-likelihood −0.162E + 8 −0.104E + 8 −0.096E + 8
Pseudo R2 0.931 0.963 0.967
Table notes. n = 16. First row: estimated coeﬃcients, second row: standard
errors. All estimates signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Weighted by population.
4In contrast to this, Levitt (1997) used the change of crimes per capita as the en-
dogenous and the change of the number of sworn police oﬃcers as the exogenous variable
(both in logarithms), that is, he estimated the elasticity of crime rates with respect to the
number of police oﬃcers.
12Table 3 contains the results of estimating (22) for the three diﬀerent risk
scenarios considered. As noted above, we additionally included population
density as a covariate. Other covariates, such as the per-capita BIP, the
unemployment rate, and so on, could be included as well and would certainly
have an inﬂuence on the exposure to crime. However, as our data is limited
to 16 observations and the ﬁt is already above 90%, we refrain from running
more regressions.
All coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1 per-cent level and exhibit the ex-
pected sign. Hiring an additional policeman signiﬁcantly decreases the proba-
bility of becoming a victim of crime, while population and population density
increase the risk. Since it is diﬃcult to interpret the size of the coeﬃcients
obtained from the logit model, we derive the respective marginal eﬀects in
the next subsection.
5.3 Marginal Eﬀects




G = ˆ β
























The term in parentheses in equation (24) shows that population has a direct
and an indirect crowding eﬀect. First, rising population increases the number
of people per police oﬃcer that have to be protected. Second, as population
density increases, the basic likelihood of crime increases.
Starting from the eﬃciency condition for the optimum level of the public
service (17), we derive a formula for the computation of the sum of the
















13into (25) gives the sum of the marginal beneﬁts of a policeman:
∆
j
G = −pG(Gj,nj)¯ `jnj . (27)




n = pn(Gj,nj)¯ `jnj . (28)
Table 4: Marginal Beneﬁts of Policemen and
Marginal Costs of Population
Risk scenario













BW 3.318.64 573.23 334.09
8.41 1.49 0.87
BAY 2.904.17 457.93 216.91
7.13 1.16 0.55
B 5.045.11 1.955.68 999.82
44.42 16.90 8.47
BB 1.107.12 247.38 185.12
2.84 0.65 0.49
HB 444.31 237.29 173.51
7.36 3.82 2.73
HH 2.760.76 1.006.06 774.74
27.52 9.82 7.40
HE 2.511.87 756.79 448.78
6.65 2.05 1.22
MVP 708.18 157.12 117.83
1.86 0.42 0.32
Table continues.
Table (4) presents the estimated marginal beneﬁts of a policeman and the
marginal costs of a citizen in terms of reduction/increase of statewide prop-
erty losses due to crime. As can be taken from the table, there a huge dif-
ferences between the states. To give an example, we focus on Bayern (BAY)
and Hamburg (HH). Hiring an additional policeman would save Bavarian
citizens roughly e2.900 per year. If we consider unsolved instances of theft
14Continuation of Table 4
Risk scenario













NDS 3.135.67 586.56 448.44
7.82 1.50 1.15
NRW 10.387.95 3.294.15 2.255.31
26.41 8.59 5.90
RLP 1.178.78 349.87 244.60
3.14 0.95 0.67
SL 456.26 132.57 79.46
2.10 0.61 0.36
SN 842.76 194.01 150.10
2.26 0.53 0.41
SNA 635.28 149.04 113.13
1.69 0.40 0.31
SH 1.707.87 435.42 230.97
4.68 1.22 0.65
TH 440.11 113.84 81.33
1.20 0.32 0.23
only, this ﬁgure melts down to e216. As compared to this, Hamburg would
save e2.760 and e774, respectively. The fact that Hamburg’s police are
less successful in preventing and detecting theft than their Bavarian counter-
parts, combined with a much larger per-capita property loss, explains why
the marginal return on an additional policeman is much higher in the city
state.
If Bayern recruits a new citizen, this costs the original citizens a bit
more than e7 per year. This property loss is due to the direct and indirect
crowding eﬀects explained above. As Hamburg already is a very crowded
place, the eﬀect is much greater: about e27.
5.4 Eﬃciency
Finally, we make an attempt to assess the eﬃciency of the provision of in-
ternal security in the German states. However, the results presented here
should be taken with a lot of caution. In particular, we want to emphasize
15that our analysis is not to be seen as a recommendation to hire or release po-
lice oﬃcers somewhere. Necessarily, our treatment of the issue is too coarse
and the data analysis depends on too many simplifying assumptions in order
to admit such conclusions. The focus of our analysis is clearly on the local-
public-good character of internal security, that is, on the returns-to-scale of
population and on crowding eﬀects. Table 4 shows that the beneﬁts of an ad-
ditional police oﬃcer are larger where many people live. At the same time, it
indicates that negative crowding eﬀects increase with increasing population
and, in particular, population density.
Of course, a complete cost-beneﬁt analysis of the police requires assump-
tions about the cost structure. This means that we have to substantiate the
right hand side of equations (17) and (20). We assume that the total cost of
the police is proportional to the number of police oﬃcers:
C
j = C(G
j) = ηGj ∀ j ∈ J , (29)
where η > 0 is the marginal costs of a policeman. The police are ﬁnanced by
uniform head taxes:
c






∀ i ∈ I, j ∈ J . (30)
Hence, (for suﬃciently large n) the marginal return on an additional citizen






Equation (31) shows that the decrease of the individual contributions to the
public service shrinks with increasing population as total costs are borne by











Using the assumptions made in the previous subsections and the cost
function (29), we obtain a simpliﬁed Samuelson condition
∆
j
G = η , (33)







16Solving these two equations for G and n yields the optimum level of internal





















Obviously, the optimum number of police oﬃcers is proportional to the op-
timum population.
















This ratio decreases with increasing absolute value of ˆ β (remember that ˆ β <
0). A larger |ˆ β| means that police oﬃcers become more eﬀective in reducing
crime risks. Hence, local authorities have to spend less funds on internal
security. The numerator speciﬁes the direct and indirect crowding eﬀect
onto the optimum number of police oﬃcers per capita: the more crowding
feeds and facilitates crime, the more police is needed.
In order to obtain values for the optimum number of police oﬃcers and
the optimum population, we would ﬁrst have to estimate the marginal cost
of a policeman η, or to take the value from an oﬃcial statistics. The respec-
tive value could then be plugged into equations (35) and (36). In our case,
where we take into account only crimes that involve a property loss, such
a proceeding would be misleading. We would dramatically overestimate the
marginal cost of an additional police oﬃcer. Hence, we present our eﬃciency
analysis in terms of the optimum number of police oﬃcers per capita.
For a hypothetical German average state with an area of 22,314 km2
(see Table 1) and a per-capita loss of e97.77 (see Table 2), we obtain the
following expressions for population:
¯ n
? ≈ 2011 × η , (38)
and number of police oﬃcers:
¯ G
? ≈ 5.2915 × η , (39)
17if we take into account all instances of crime (see Table 3 for parameters).
Accordingly, the number of police oﬃcers per 1000 citizens is given by
¯ g
?(×1000) ≈ 2.63 . (40)
Comparing this number with the actual number of police oﬃcers per 1000
citizens, which is 3.18 (see Table 1), shows that according to this measure,
the number of police oﬃcers is relatively high.
Table 5: Actual and Optimum Number of
Policemen per 1000 Citizens
Optimum




BW 2.86 2.53 2.60 2.60
BAY 2.92 2.45 2.52 2.53
B 7.12 8.80 8.63 8.46
BB 3.84 2.56 2.63 2.64
HB 5.03 16.57 16.11 15.72
HH 5.60 9.97 9.76 9.55
HE 2.93 2.64 2.70 2.71
MVP 3.80 2.62 2.68 2.68
NDS 2.75 2.49 2.56 2.57
NRW 2.57 2.54 2.60 2.61
RLP 2.73 2.66 2.72 2.72
SL 3.20 4.60 4.59 4.54
SN 3.47 2.68 2.74 2.74
SNA 4.02 2.65 2.71 2.72
SH 2.77 2.73 2.79 2.79
TH 3.31 2.72 2.78 2.79
εG,n
a 0.626 0.626 0.627 0.627
Table note. aElasticity of the number of police oﬃcers with
respect to population.
Table 5 lists the actual number of police oﬃcers per 1000 citizens for each
German state and, as before, the optimum values for all cases, only unsolved
instances of crime, and unsolved theft. As can be taken from the table,
Germany’s capital Berlin (B) exhibits the highest per-capita level of police
protection, about 7 police oﬃcers per 1000 citizens. Still, our theoretical and
empirical analysis suggests that this number is too low. Germany’s largest
state both in terms of area and population, Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW)
18aﬀords about 2.5 police oﬃcers per 1000 citizens. Though this value is much
smaller than Berlin’s, it seems to be in the optimum range. The diﬀerence
between Berlin and NRW is, of course, due to the lower level of congestion in
NRW. In Bayern (BAY), the level of internal security is a bit too high, while
Hamburg (HH) does not spend enough on the police (in per capita terms).
Another interesting case is Bremen (HB), which is Germany’s smallest
state. The downtown of Bremen takes only 404 km2 (see Table 1). Hence,
returns to scale are at a very low level, and a relatively high per-capita
endowment with police oﬃcers is required. In order to clarify this point,
we compute the optimum population according to formula (36), which gives
2,746 × η. Assuming that the actual population of Bremen is the optimum
population, gives η = 241. For G? we have according to equation (35) 45.51×
η = 10,989. The actual number of police oﬃcers in Bremen is, however, only
3,342, that is, more than three times smaller.
Deﬁne εG,n = Gn/g as the elasticity of the (optimum) number of police
oﬃcers with respect to population, in short, the so-called population elastic-
ity. Note that this deﬁnition of the population elasticity does not depend on
the metrization of the public good in the utility function (compare Reiter and
Weichenrieder, 1999). Running simple OLS regression (through the origin)
with the logarithms of the actual and the optimum number of police oﬃcers
(Gj is taken from Table 1, G?
j is given by g?
j ×nj taken from Tables 1 and 5)
as the endogenous variable and the logarithm of population as the exogenous
variable yields the ﬁgures reported at the bottom of Table 5. Irrespective
of whether we consider the actual or the optimum numbers, the population
elasticity is a bit greater than 0.62.5
As Reiter and Weichenrieder (1999) have shown, the estimates of the pop-
ulation elasticity obtained from diﬀerent empirical studies cannot be com-
pared easily if diﬀerent metrizations of the public good or diﬀerent measure-
ment units have been chosen. Using Bewley’s (1981) terminology, εG,n = 1
would mean that internal security is a pure public service, while εG,n = 0
would mean that internal security is a pure public good. Hence, our es-
timates suggest that the police exhibits a signiﬁcant degree of publicness.
This result contradicts most other empirical studies (see Table 1 in Reiter
and Weichenrieder, 1997).
5We do not report the full estimation results here in order to save space. 95% conﬁdence
intervals indicate that the εG,n’s are larger than 0.6 and smaller than 0.65. Note that the
g?
j’s themselves are stochastic quantities.
196 Conclusions
In a recent paper, Lohse et al. (2005) broadened the topology of public
goods by those which reduce the risk and/or the extent of proprietary losses.
While Lohse et al. focussed only on pure public goods, we derive eﬃciency
conditions for local public services the beneﬁts of which are spatially limited
and subject to crowding. The respective Samuelson condition states that
the optimum level of the public service is reached where the sum of the
marginal beneﬁts in terms of reduction of expected property losses equates
the marginal costs of the service. According to the membership condition,
the sum of the marginal crowding eﬀects caused by an additional citizen
in terms of increased risk of a property loss must meet the decrease in the
original citizen’s contribution to the public service.
In our empirical application, we present an eﬃciency analysis of the provi-
sion of internal security in Germany. Our data refers to the state level. Since
the eﬃciency conditions presented in this paper depend on the assumption
that proprietary risks can be fully underwritten, we only consider oﬀenses
which involve a measurable loss of property. Estimates for the marginal ben-
eﬁts of an additional police oﬃcer and for the marginal costs of an additional
police oﬃcers are derived. The eﬃciency of the provision of the police is then
assessed with respect to the optimum number of police oﬃcers per citizen.
Our data suggests that there are strong returns-to-scale in the provision of
internal security as small states require many more police oﬃcers per capita
than larger ones.
Levitt (1997) found that in the US the social beneﬁt of reduced crime was
about $ 100,000 per oﬃcer per year and, therefore, concluded that the current
number of police was below the optimal level. With regard to our study, such
conclusions would be inadequate as we restricted our attention to oﬀenses
involving property damage. However, the analysis of actual and optimum
per-capita endowments of the German l¨ ander with police oﬃcers warrants
some cautious policy recommendations. First, due to strong crowding exter-
nalities the city states, Berlin (B), Bremen (HB) and Hamburg (HH), require
more police oﬃcers in per-capita terms although their actual endowments
are already relatively high. Second, the former East German states, Bran-
denburg (BB), Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MVP), Sachsen (SN), Sachsen-
Anhalt (SNA) and Th¨ urigen (TH) are sparsely populated and therefore need
less police oﬃcers than they currently have. Third, due to returns-to-scale in
the provision of internal security, large states need less police oﬃcers in per-
capita terms than small units. Our data suggests that in the smaller states,
population is not at the optimum level. Hence, one could rethink the present
structure of the German l¨ ander. Indeed, there is an ongoing discussion in
20Germany about amalgamating some of the smaller states.
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